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ABSTRACT
The September 1985 decision of the G-5 countries topursue
coordinated intervention has been widely credited with the
subsequent sharp decline of the dollar relative to other major
currencies. On the surface, the dollar's decline appears as
evidence that coordinated intervention can be an effective
instrument of economic policy, contrary to most of the previous
economic analysis of this issue.
The evidence in the present paper shows that such a conclusion
is unwarranted. The dollar's decline in the nine months after
the G—5 agreement was generally no faster than it had been since
the beginning of its decline in the spring of 1985. The only
indication of discontinuity in the overall behavior of the dollar
was a drop of about 4 percent that occurred Immediately after the
G-5 meeting and that has largely persisted.
Although this evidence cannot be taken as a conclusive
indication that coordinated intervention had no effect on the
dollar's rate of decline. it does show the Inappropriateness of
interpreting the dollar's decline after September 1985 as
evidence that coordinated intervention was effective.
The special case of the Japanese yen is more ambiguous.
Unlike all of the other G-5 currencies, the yen did appreciate
more rapidly after the G—5 meeting than it did before. But the
Japanese government was also unique in making a major shift in
monetary policy immediately after the G-5 meeting to strengthen
the yen and the yen was also the major currency that could be
expected to appreciate most as a result of the massive and
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The sharp rise in the value of the dollar that began in 1980
eventually brought widespread calls for active government
intervention in foreign exchange markets. American business
leaders wanted the dollar reduced because they recognized that
the strong dollar was depressing exports and encouraging a major
increase In imports to the United States. More surprisingly.
European officials wanted to see a lower dollar because the
rising dollar created inflationary pressure in their own
countries that was inducing them to pursue an undesirably tight
monetary policy,1 while the Japanese government favored a lower
dollar to ease the protectionist sentiment developing in the
United States.
Most economists, even if they accepted the desirability of
lowering the dollar's value, rejected pure exchange market
intervention as an ineffective policy instrument. Since the
*professor of Economics, Harvard University, and President, The
National Bureau of Economic Research. I am grateful to Fiona
Scott—Morton for help with the calculations reported in this
paper and to Data Resources, Inc. for the use of computing
facilities. This research is part of the NEER Research Project
on Exchange Rate Misalignment.
1See Feldstein (1986a) and Feldstein and Bacchetta (1986)
for a discussion of the effect of the strong dollar on European
monetary and fiscal policy.
1exchange value of the dollar is determined by the interaction of
supply and demand in world security markets, the magnitude of
intervention is inevitably too small to have a significant and
sustained effect on the dollar exchange rate.2 Although the
dollar's value could be reduced by a nonsterilized intervention
in which the U.S. government increased the U.S. money supply by
the same volume of dollars that it exchanged for foreign
currencies, the real reason for the dollar's fall in such a case
would be the easing of U.S. monetary policy and not the
intervention in foreign exchange markets.
This view was well summarized by Obstfeld (1985, p. 395)
when he wrote: "...theoverwhelming conclusion of recent
research is that in the present international environment, only
intervention that is permitted to affect the money supply has a
significant impact on the exchange rate." An international group
of experts appointed by the International Monetary Fund stated a
similar if more guarded conclusion in its 1983 report to the IMF
Interim Committee (The Jurgensen Report of the Working Group on
Exchange Market Intervention).
But although widely held, this view of the ineffectiveness
of sterilized intervention is far from the unanimous judgement of
respected international economists. Those who believe that
sterilized intervention can be effective emphasize that price
setting in exchange rate markets is dominated by changes in
2Thedaily volume of foreign exchange trading in London,
New York and Tokyo as of March 1986 was officially estimated to
be $188 billion.
2expectations and risk premia rather than by shifts in the current
stocks of financial assets. The prospect of government
intervention, especially the coordinated intervention of several
leading governments, can change the expectations or at least the
perceived risks of holding individual currencies. This is
particularly true when a government is thought to be committed to
reducing rather than defending the value of its own currency
since it has an effectively unlimited supply of the currency for
that purpose.
Thus Richard Cooper (1985, p. 454) explicitly rejected
Obstfeld's conclusion, writing that "The evidence is, in fact,
quite ambiguous; the tests are weak; they apply mainly to the
influence of asset composition on the exchange risk premium
rather than to sterilized intervention as such; and they often
assume rational expectations, which may be what the tests are
really rejecting.?? Similarly. Fred Bergsten (1986, p. 233)
advocated that "the major central banks should take advantage of
just such occasions —whenthe markets are already pushing
currency relationships in the direction of underlying equilibrium
—throughjoint intervention to promote the needed degree of
adjustment. Such leaning with the wind' would have important
signalling as well as substantive effects. -." Eventhe Jurgensen
Report held out the possibility that coordinated intervention
might be more powerful that the sum of the individual
interventions because of Its psychological impact and that there
might be a synergistic interaction if coordinated intervention
3were pursued in conjunction with other macroeconomic policies.3
Resistance by the U.S. government precluded any coordinated
intervention against the dollar until September 1985. Economists
in the Reagan administration generally believed that
nonsterilized intervention would be ineffective in itself and
likely to evolve into a sterilized intervention that caused an
unwarranted inflationary easing of money. Some administration
political officials pointed to the strong dollar as evidence of
the world's approval of American economic policies and attributed
much of the increased trade deficit to rapid U.S. growth and
foreign protectionism rather than the level of the dollar.
But by September 1985. the magnitude of the U.S. trade
deficit, the increasing Congressional threat of protectionist
legislation, and the changes in senior administration economic
officials produced a new attitude toward intervention in the
Reagan administration. In addition, the dollar's decline since
March of that year meant that political spokesmen could no longer
point to the rising dollar as an indication of the world's
approbation of Reaganomics.
The meeting of the finance ministers and central bank
leaders of the G-5 countries (the U.S., Germany, Japan, England
and France) at the Plaza Hotel in New York on September 22. 1985
brought an abrupt change in U.S. policy and began a period of
Although Ronald McKinnon was a forceful advocate of
intervention to reduce the dollar's value, he argued for
nonsterilized Intervention because he believed that the high
value of the dollar reflected an excessively tight monetary
policy. See, e.g., McKinnon (1983).
4coordinated exchange rate intervention. At the end of the
meeting. U.S. Treasury Secretary James Baker reversed the
prevailing position of the Reagan administration by announcing
that the dollar was overvalued and that the American economy
would benefit from a decline of the dollar. Secretary Baker then
went substantially further in reversing the position of the
American government by agreeing with the other G—5 finance
ministers that the United States would join with other countries
in coordinated intervention in foreign exchange markets. The
central banks of the major countries intervened heavily in the
days after the release of the G-5 communique.
The dollar fell immediately, declining about 5 percent
against major currencies in the first day of trading after the
G-5 meeting. In the following nine months, the dollar slid an
additional 25 percent against the yen, 18 percent against the
German mark, and 15 percent against a multilateral trade weighed
basket of currencies.
Throughout this period, the G-5 meeting and the willingness
of the major governments to engage in coordinated intervention
has been hailed In the popular press and in official circles as
the cause for the dollar's sharp decline. In contrast, academic
researchers have been surprisingly quiet about the implications
of the G-5 experiment for the previous debate about the
effectiveness of exchange market intervention. The purpose of
the present paper is to see whether the traditional skepticism
about the efficacy of sterilized intervention needs to be
5reconsidered in light of the experience of the past year.
There have of course been many events during the year
beginning in September 1985 that taken together could, in
principle, explain the dollar's decline.Japan first tightened
and then eased domestic monetary policy. The growth rate of the
United States waned. The Federal Reserve reduced the discount
rate several times and allowed Ml to surge above the upper limit
of its target range. The price of oil collapsed to less than
half of its value at the beginning of the period. In short,
there were more than enough important changes in the economic
situation so that those who wished to hold to the view that
intervention and the prospect of intervention are ineffective
need not change their minds despite the dollar's sharp decline of
the past year.
But the case that the G-5 agreement and the subsequent
coordinated exchange market intervention have not altered the
pace of the evolution of the dollar is much stronger than this
appeal to an abundance of other possible explanations of the
dollar's rapid decline. The evidence presented in this paper
indicates that the decline in the dollar after the G-5 meeting
was essentially just a continuation of the decline that had begun
I say "in principle" because the experience with
econometric models of short-run exchange rate movements has not
been very satisfactory. See, for example, the analysis in Meese
and Rogoff (1985). Of course, these models may simply have
misspecified the process of exchange rate determination. For
evidence of the ability to explain longer-term movements of the
dollar in terms of economic fundamentals, see Feldstein (19&5b)
and the works cited therein.
6six months earlier. There has been no significant and sustained
acceleration in the pace of the dollar's decline to be attributed
to coordinated intervention or to the new attitude of the U.S.
government.
More specifically, the overall trade-weighted value of the
dollar dropped by 3.1 percent immediately after the G-5 meeting
but then continued to decline at the same average rate of 2.0
percent a month rate for the next nine months that it had
experienced since the decline began in March 1985. The
statistical evidence for the German mark and the Swiss franc are
quite similar. Among the G-5 currencies, only the Japanese yen
showed a significantly more rapid decline in the months after the
G-5 meeting than it had before; some possible reasons for this
difference are discussed below.
Of course, the evidence that the dollar has been declining
at the same pace against the trade-weighted basket of other
currencies since the G-5 meeting that it was before is not proof
that the G-5 rhetoric and subsequent coordinated intervention
have not been influential. Defenders of the efficacy of
intervention can claim that other factors have offset the
acceleration of the dollar's decline that the intervention would
otherwise have produced. Or, more simply, they might argue that
without intervention the previous decline of the dollar would
have slowed or stopped. These possibilities cannot be resolved
until a convincing econometric model of exchange rate
determination that covers this period has been estimated. But
7the evidence in this paper eliminates the apparent prima fade
case that the shift in exchange rate intervention policy has
produced a sharp decline of the dollar.
The paper begins by examining the monthly behavior of a
trade-weighted index of the value of the dollar and then, in
section 2. considers five other measures of the dollar's
movement: the bilateral exchange rate index calculated by the
Morgan Guaranty Bank and the exchange rates between the dollar
and the German mark, the Swiss franc, the British pound. and the
Japanese yen. The third section briefly analyzes corresponding
behavior with weekly data. There is a final concluding section.
1. Tests of Discontinuity of the Dollar's Decline
Figure 1 shows the Federal Reserve Board's multilateral
trade-weighted index of the value of the dollar in each month
between January 1985 and June 1986. the latest complete month at
the time that the present study began.5This series is defined
as a weighted average of the dollar exchange rates for the other
G-11 countries, weighting by their shares in global trade in 1972
through 1976. The vertical line through September 1985 indicates
the time of the G—5 Plaza meeting.
The dollar, which had been rising since the middle of 1980.
reached a peak in February 1985 and then began to decline. A
I am grateful to the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System for providing these data. This series corresponds
to the multilateral trade weighted dollar value published













The Multilateral Trade Weighted Value of the Dollar
Time Jan Sept June
1985 1985 1986least squares regression of the logarithm of the dollar exchange
rate index on a time trend shows a decline at a rate of 2.3
percent a month from March 1985 through June 1986:




where DOLMTW is the multilateral trade weighted Index of the
dollar value and time is a linear time trend in which the unit is
one month.
To test whether the dollar declined more rapidly after the
G-5 meeting, a second time trend (Time2) is added which takes the
value zero until September 1985 and then increases at one unit
per month from October 1985 through June 1986:





The point estimate of the coefficient of the TIme2 variable
implies that the dollar actually fell more slowly in the period
since the G-5 meeting than in the months before. But the
coefficient is less than its standard error and therefore cannot
be regarded as significantly different from zero.
A more general test of a discontinuity in the trend of the
dollar's value is provided by equation 3 that adds a shift term
9equal to zero through September 1985 and then equal to one
thereafter:





Although the coefficient of the second time trend variable
(Time2) remains very small and not significantly different from
zero, the coefficient of the Shift variable implies that, after
adjusting for the time trend, the value of the dollar was three
percent lower in the period after the G-5 meeting than it had
been during the previous months. Since the immediate effect of
the G-5 meeting was a drop of approximately five percent in the
dollar relative to this multilateral index, the shiftparameter
indicates that this one-time decline was partially preserved
during the subsequent months.
Since the second time trend remains insignificant in this
specification, the basic relation with a single time trend and
the shift parameter is re-estimated as equation 4:





10Equation 4 indicates a 2.0 percent per month rate of decline over
the entire period with an additional one-time 3 percent decline
after the G—5 meeting. The magnitude of this downward shift is
thus approximately equal to the trend decline that occurs in six
weeks. One possible interpretation of this shift is that the
prospect of exchange market intervention created a persistent
risk differential that lowered the dollar by three percent.
One source of ambiguity in defining these tests is the
proper treatment of September 1985. the month in which the G-5
meeting occurred. I have therefore re-estimated all of the
equations with a sample that excludes September 1985. The
results are quite similar to the equations that have been
presented although omitting September reduces the size and
statistical significance of the shift effect. Thus, analogous to
equation 3 but for the modified sample, the estimates are:






The point estimates indicate that the time trend is slightly
stronger before September (2.5 percent a month instead of the 2.2
percent estimated in equation 3) but the same after the G-5
meeting (1.9 percent a month). The large standard errors,
however, suggest that this is probably just random variation and
11that there was no change in the trend rate of decline of the
dollar. The shift coefficient is only half of its value in
equation 3 and less than its standard error.
Omitting the Time2 variable (i.e., estimating a
specification similar to equation 4) still leaves the coefficient
of the Shift variable insignificant (0.024 with a standard error
of 0.016). A statistically superior specification in this sample
is the analog of equation 2:






This specification implies that the rate of decline of the dollar
fell by about one fourth after the G-5 meeting and that there was
no persistent downward shift in the level of the dollar.
Although I would not argue that it is better to omit the
September observation in this way. I would note that dealing with
the sample problem in this way reinforces the conclusion that G-5
meeting did not initiate a decline in the value of the dollar.
A second type of specification ambiguity is the choice
between a logarithmic and a linear specification. While the
proportional rate of change implied by the logarithmic
specification seems most natural in the current context, the
alternative linear specification was also estimated. The results
12are very similar to the logarithmic specification. For example,
when all months are included in the sample, the second time trend
variable is actually positive in the specifications analogous to
equations 2 and 3. The shift coefficient is however negative,
more than twice its standard error, and approximately one and a
half times the monthly decline. Omitting September changes the
linear results in essentially the same way as the logarithmic
specification. The shift coefficient is statistically
insignificant while the second time trend is significantly
positive.
These estimates of the behavior of the most general
multilateral trade weighted measure of the dollar exchange rate
provide no support for the view that the dollar declined more
rapidly after the G-5 meeting than it did before. Any
persistence of the downward shift that occurred immediately after
the G-5 meeting is ambiguous and depends on whether the sample is
defined to include or exclude the month of the G-5 meeting.
2. Experience with Bilateral Exchanae Rates
Table 1 summarizes the estimated coefficients for equations
similar to 1 through 4 for bilateral exchange rates between the
dollar and the German mark, the Swiss franc, the English pound
and the Japanese yen as well for the frequently cited Morgan
Guaranty Bank bilateral weighted index of the dollarts value.
For comparison, the multilateral trade weighted estimates of
equations 1 through 4 are also presented. Separate estimates are
13given for logarithmic and for linear time trends. All of the
estimates are based on the entire sample of monthly observations
from March 1985 through June 1986.
The coefficients are presented in a way that is designed to
give all of the relevant information in the minimum possible
amount of space. Instead of presenting standard errors of the
coefficients, a system of parentheses and square brackets is used
to indicate the statistical significance of the coefficients. A
coefficient that is presented without any parentheses or square
brackets is more than twice its standard error; this is always
true of the basic time trend. A coefficient in parentheses is
more than its standard error but less than twice its standard
error. Finally, a coefficient in square brackets is less than
its standard error and therefore not significantly different from
zero at even the 35 percent level. Constant terms are not shown
because they are of no interest in the current context. Finally,
since the corrected R2 values generally exceed 0.9 and are not of
interest per Se. the value of this measure of fit is not shown; I
comment below on the one case in which the correct R2 value is
less than 0.9.
The first four rows under the logarithmic specification
summarize the coefficients for the multilateral trade weighted
index already presented in equations 1 through 4. The
corresponding linear specifications are presented in the right
hand half of the table. These have already been discussed and
need no further comment.
14Table 1
Analysis of Monthly Dollar Exchange Rate Moveaents
March 1985 through June 1986
Currency or Logarlthiic Linear
Specification 5ec1fication
Multilateral -.023 1.8-.030 1.5
Trade Weighted —.025[.003] 1.9-.037(.010) 2.0
Index -.022[.003] —.0302.0-.032(.009) -.0422.0
-.020 -.0311.9-.026 -.0461.6
rgan Bank - .018 2.3-.021 2.1
Bilateral —.018[.000] 2.3—.023[.003] 2.3
Index —.015[.000] -.0212.2-.020[.003] -.0272.3
-.015 —.0212.2—.018 -.028 2.1
Gerzan -.027 1.6-.074 1.5
Mark —.028(.002] 1.7-.086(.019) 1.8
-.025(.002] —.0391.7—.076(.019) —.1111.9
—.024 —.0391.7—.064 -.1111.5
SwIss -.028 2.2-.064 1.7
ranc -.032(.006) 2.6-.081.028 2.6
-.029(.006) (-.036) 2.5-.073.028(-.084) 1.6
-.025 (-.036) 2.1-.057 (-.084) 1.6
British -.018 .55-.014 .5
Pound -.033.027 1.7-.027.023 1.5
-.035.027[.016]1.9-.028.023[.016] 1.8
-.019 [.016].59—.015 [.016].6
Japanese -.031 .79—.066 1.0
-.020—.019 1.5-.050—.026 1.3
-.015-.019—.0622.1-.036—.026-.1592.1
-.026 -.062.62-.052 -.159 0.9
A coefficient in parentheses exceeds its standard error but is
less than twice Its standard error.A coefficient in square
bracketsisless than its standard error. Other coefficients are
sore than twice their standard error.Constant ter*s are
estisated but not s&wn shown. The R2 of oath equation exceeds
0.9 except for the first and fourth equations for the BritishThe next four rows relate to the behavior of the Morgan
Guaranty Bank bilateral trade weighted index of the dollar's
value. This index is a weighted average of the exchange rates
between the dollar and 16 currencies, weighting the exchange rate
by the volume of trade between that country and the United
States. This differs from the Federal Reserve Bank's
multilateral index which weights individual exchange rates on the
basis of that country's share in world trade. The conceptual
advantage of using world trade weights for each bilateral
exchange rate is that the world trade weights reflect the fact
that the United States competes against (say) German products not
only in Germany but in other countries as well. As a practical
matter, the primary effect of using the Morgan Guaranty index is
to give substantially much more weight to Canada than in the
multilateral index.
The coefficients for the bilateral index are somewhat
smaller than the corresponding multilateral ones (about one—fifth
smaller for the trends and about one-third smaller for the shift
coefficient) but otherwise very similar in the story that they
tell. The smaller size of the coefficients is due primarily to
the fact that the Canadian dollar has actually depreciated
relative to the U.S. dollar and this bilateral relationship is
given substantially more weight in the Morgan Bank index than in
the Federal Reserve's multilateral Index. Note in particular
that the estimated coefficient of Time2 is very small (less than
one percent of the basic time trend) and less than its standard
15error.
The behavior of the German mark (DM) is particularly
important because the DM is not only the principal European
currency but also because, through the European Monetary System.
the DM effectively governs the exchange rates of the other
European currencies with the dollar. The estimated coefficients
indicate that the dollar fell relative to the DM at the same rate
of about 2.5 percent a month after the G-5 meeting as it had
before. The coefficient of the second time trend is positive and
less than its standard error. The evidence also indicates that
the drop in the dollar immediately after the G-5 meeting has
largely persisted. The dollar-mark relationship is thus very
similar to the pattern observed for the multilateral trade
weighted value of the dollar.6
The linear specification of the dollar-DM relation provides
essentially the same picture but with a somewhat stronger
indication that the dollar's rate of decline has actually slowed
since the G-5 meeting. The point estimates of the coefficients
indicate that the dollar fell at a rate of 7.6 pfennigs per month
before the G-5 meeting but only 5.7 pfennings per month after the
G-5 meeting. The positive secondary time trend of 1.9 pfennigs
per month was more than enough to outweigh the 11.1 pfennig
Excluding the month of September from the sample reduces
the size and statistical significance of the shift term (to 3.2
percent with a standard error of 1.9 percent) but otherwise
leaves the picture of the dollar-mark relationship essentially
unchanged. Results for the sample without September 1985 are
presented as appendix table A-i.
16decline at the time of G-5 meeting before thesummer of 1986.
The relatively large standard error of thesecondary time trend
requires caution in this interpretation. The alternative view
that the dollar has declined at a constant rate of 6.4pfennings
per month, with a one time additional drop of 11.1 pfennigs at
the time of the G-5 meeting, cannot be rejected at standard
levels of significance.
Although the Swiss franc is not part of the European
Monetary System, the Swiss have pursued a policy of pegging the
Swiss franc to the German mark. The success of thispolicy is
apparent in the general similarity of the coefficients for the
Swiss franc and the German mark. The franc declined ata rate of
2.5 percent before and after the G-5 meeting witha one-time 3.6
percent decline in the dollar-franc ratio after the G-5 meeting
occurred. The point estimates are thus almost identical to those
of the German mark. However, the larger standarderror of the
shift coefficient in the dollar-franc relationsuggests that
there may not have been any persistent decline in the levelof
the dollar relative to the Swiss franc after the G-5meeting.
Moreover, the linear specification for the dollar-franc relation
implies that the dollar decline slowed significantly after the G-
5 meeting (from 8.1 centimes per month before the G-5 to5.3
centimes per month after the G-5 meeting).7
When the observation for September 1985 is omitted the
estimated linear relation is essentially unchanged while the
estimates with the logarithmic specification becomes similarto
the linear results; i.e., the second time trend issignificantly
positive and equal to about one-third of the basic time trend.
17The dollar's ratio to the British pound behaved very
differently than the dollar's ratio to the other G-5 currencies.
For the period as a whole, the dollar declined relative to the
pound at an average rate of only 1.8 percent a month,
substantially less than the 2.7 percent rate against the mark and
the 3.1 percent rate against the yen. Moreover, the time trend
relation is statistically weak with a corrected R2 of only 0.83
and a Durbin-Watson statistic of 0.55 that indicates a
fundamental misspecification in the log-linear time trend.
Introducing the second time trend not only improves the overall
fit of the equation (raising the corrected R2 to 0.95) but also
eliminates the serious serial correlation of the residuals (with
the Durbin-Watson statistic rising to 1.7). The second post—G5
time trend is positive and about as large In absolute size as the
basic negative trend. These estimates thus imply that the dollar
fell relative to the pound at a rate of 3.3 percent a month until
the G-5 meeting but only declined at a rate of 0.6 percent a
month after the meeting. A similar pattern emerges in the linear
specification. The dollar's rate of decline relative to the
pound was substantially less after the G-5 meeting than it had
been before.
The final currency to be considered is the Japanese yen.0
In contrast to the experience relative to the other G-5
Although the French franc is also one of the G—5
currencies, I have not presented results for the French franc
because its behavior so closely parallels that of the German mark
to which it is tied through the EMS.
18currencies, the dollar did decline more rapidly relative to the
yen after the G-5 meeting than before. The estimates shown in
table 1 indicate that the dollar—yen ratio fell at a rate of 1.5
percent per month before the G-5 meeting, and 3.4 percent after
the meeting. In addition, the dollar-yen ratio shifted down by a
persistent 6.2 percent at the time of the meeting. The linear
specification presents a similar pattern. This picture is
unchanged by omitting the observation for September.
It would be wrong, however, to interpret this rise in the
yen as evidence of the efficacy of sterilized intervention. At
the time of the G-5 meeting the Japanese announced that they
would change their domestic monetary policy in order to increase
the value of the yen.9 Short-term yen interest rates in Japan
were raised sharply to make yen investments more attractive, the
3-month Euroyen rate rising within six weeks of the G-5 meeting
from the 6.25 to 6.50 range where it had been for the past two
years to more than 8.0 percent by mid-November. The dollar
declined by approximately 15 percent against the yen during this
six week period, a decline equal to nearly two-thirds of the
dollar's accelerated fall against the yen between September and
June. The question that remains to be settled by future research
is whether nonsterilized intervention during this period raised
the yen by any more than would have been expected from the
tightening of monetary policy alone.
The Japanese statement promised that Japan would follow
a "flexible management of monetary policy with due attention to
the yen rate."
19Although nominal yen interest rates have declined since late
1985, real interest rates in Japan have been extremely high as
Japanese producer prices fell by an unprecedented 10 percent In
the 12 months through June 1986. The value of the yen relative
to other currencies was also raised during the first half of 1986
by the unexpected and sharp fall in the price of oil. Since the
Japanese produce no oil domestically, the fall in the price of
oil represented a major unexpected improvement in Japan's future
trade balance. The decline in the cost of oil imports required a
rise in the yen in order to shrink Japan's non-oil trade surplus
to maintain the initial level of the capital outflow.
It will take additional econometric research to see whether
the unusually rapid rise in the yen since September 1985 is fully
explained by the such fundamental factors as the shift in
Japanese monetary policy, the decline in the price of oil, and
the surprising strength of the Japanese trade balance. Although
the possibility that Intervention per se accelerated the yen's
rise cannot be ruled out until that reserach is done, the current
evidence can hardly be said to provide a powerful case for the
efficacy of sterilized intervention. This Is particularly true
since the Japanese were subsequently unsuccessful when they
intervened in an attempt to stop the yen's further appreciation
when it reached an exchange rate of 180 yen to the dollar.
203.An Analysis of Weekly xchane Rate Movements
The relatively short period since the dollar began to
decline provides only 16 monthly observations on each exchange
rate. A shift to weekly observations permits a more than
fourfold increase in the number of observations, although the
increase in actual information is obviously much less.
Table 2 presents the estimated coefficients based on weekly
observations from the first full week of March 1985 through the
last week of June 1986. The two time trend variables are now
measured in weeks, implying that the scale of the trend
coefficients should be smaller than the corresponding monthly
coefficients by a factor of approximately 4.3.
Ordinary least squares estimates with the weekly data
generally had very low Durbin-Watson statistics (below one),
implying serious autocorrelation of the disturbances. In the
current context, with truly exogenous regressors, such
autocorrelatlon results in inefficient but unbiased parameter
estimates with biased standard errors. The coefficients
presented in table 2 are therefore estimated with a first—order
autocorrelation correction. The simultaneously estimated
autocorrelation parameter is also shown (in the column marked
rho). The Durbin-Watson statistics of these transformed
estimates are generally between 1.5 and 2.0. A comparison of the
transformed and OLS estimates actually shows very little
difference.
The estimates based on weekly data presented in Table 2
21Table 2
Analyeisof NeeklyDollar Exthange Rate IIoeeents
Narth1985 throughJune 1986
Currency or kgarithalc Linear
Soeciflcatlon Specification
I1 T1Z if1
Baltilateral —.0053 .74 1.3-.0065 .76 1.3
Trade weighted-.0035—.0015 .82 1.4-.0029 -.0025 .77 1.3
Index —.0049 (.0009] —.074.76 1.4—.0048 (—.0003] (-.065] .77 1.3
—.0043 —.050 .77 1.4—.0050 -.073.77 1.3
)organ Bank —.0040 .69 1.4-.0048 .71 1.4
Bilateral —.0021 —.0016 .84 1.4-.0024 —.0021 .88 1.4
ladex —.0030 (—.0008] —.049 .81 1.4—.0040 (—.0006] —.083.82 1.4
—.0030 —.051 .81 1.4-.0036 —.065.82 1.4
Gerian -.0063 .66 1.7—.017 .71 1.7
aaxk —.0045 —.0016 .71 1.8—.012 —.005 .78 1.9
—.0056 [.0005] —.068 .67 1.8—.017(.005)-.298.67 1.8
—.0053 —.054 .67 1.8—.014 —.162.71 1.8
Swine —.0065 .65 1.7—.015 .73 1.8
franc -.0040-.0013 .72 1.8-.011-.003 .81 1.9
-.0067 (.0017) -.097 .62 1.8-.017.007 —.324.62 1.8
-.0035 —.051 .67 1.8—.012 -.131 .741.9
British .0042 .85 2.0.005 .81 2.0
pound .0024.0017 .91 2.0.003.002 .89 2.1
.0068 —.0061.219.75 1.9.008 —.007 .259.72 1.9
.0032 .060.88 2.0.004 .081.86 2.0
Japanese —.0070 .85 1.7—.015 .82 1.6
yen -.0047 -.0020 .73 2.0-.009-.005 .63 1.9
-.0034 -.0044.077.61 1.9-.009-.006 (.056].62 1.9
-.0062 -.049 .84 1.7-.013 -.118.78 2.0
All equations are estiaated with a first-order autoarrelation rrectiori. The
autorrelationonefficient of thelagged ridual is shown as Rho.
A onefficient in parentheses emede its standard error bat It l than its
standard error. A efficIent in square brats is lees than Its standard error. Other
ouefflcient are sore than tidc their standard errors. Constant terne are estiaated but
not shown. The R2 of seth equation exceede 0.9.confirm the conclusions based on the monthly estimates presented
in Table 1. With the exception of the relation to the Japanese
yen, the evidence indicates that the dollar shifted down by about
5 percent after the G-5 meeting but that there has not been an
accelerated rate of decline since then.
Consider, for example, the multilateral trade weighted
index. The first entry in the table shows that this declined at
a rate of 0.53 percent per week, just in line with the 2.3 percnt
per month decline shown in Table 1. When a second time trend is
introduced, the parameter estimates imply a 0.35 percent weekly
decline before the G-5 meeting and a 0.50 percent weekly decline
after the G-5 meeting. But this is a spurious result, as the
next entry in the table indicates. When a shift term is
introduced, it is statistically significant while the second time
trend becomes positive, very small and less than half of its
standard error. The final entry for the multilateral trade
weighted index shows that the index declined at 0.43 percent per
week over the entire period but with a 5.0 percent downward shift
immediately after the G-5 meeting.
The result is essentially the same for the bilateral Morgan
Guaranty index, the German mark and the Swiss franc. The results
for the British pound are quite erratic, suggesting more of a
positive trend and upward shift ih the dollar's relative value
than that implied by the monthly data. Only for the yen is there
clear evidence of a greater decline in the post-G5 period than
before, just as with the monthly data.
22The linear specifications present a similar picture: a
moderate downward shift in the dollar after the G—5 meeting but
no evidence of a more rapid decline in the post—G5 period than
before except for the yen.
4. Concluding Comment
The September 1985 decision of the G-5 countries to pursue
coordinated intervention has been widely credited with the
subsequent sharp decline of the dollar relative to other major
currencies. On the surface, the dollar's decline appears as
evidence that coordinated intervention can be an effective
instrument of economic policy, contrary to most of the previous
economic analysis of this issue.
The evidence in the present paper shows that such a
conclusion is unwarranted. The dollar's decline in the nine
months after the G-5 agreement was generally no faster than it
had been since the beginning of its decline in the spring of
1985. The only indication of discontinuity in the overall
behavior of the dollar was a drop of about 4 percent that
occurred immediately after the G-5 meeting and that has largely
persisted.
Although this evidence cannot be taken as a conclusive
indication that coordinated intervention had no effect on the
exchange rate, it does show the inappropriateness of interpreting
the dollar's decline after September 1985 as evidence that
coordinated intervention was effective.
23The special case of the Japanese yen is more ambiguous.
Unlike all of the other G-5 currencies, theyen did appreciate
more rapidly after the G—5 meeting than it did before. But the
Japanese government was also unique in making a major shift in
monetary policy immediately after the G-5 meeting to strengthen
the yen and the yen was also the majorcurrency that could be
expected to appreciate most as a result of the massive and
unexpected decline of the price of oil in the fir5t half of 1986.
Only careful econometric work can hope to resolve whether
the policy of coordinated intervention had an effect on the
course of the dollar after the G—5 agreement. The analysis of
the present paper shows that until such evidence Is produced, it
would be wrong to Infer that intervention as such playedany part




AnalyBle of Monthly Dollar F.xchange Rate Meazureients
Mardi 1985 through June 1986 excluding Sept 1985
Currencyor Logarlthilc Linear ln Secif1cation Sec1flcatlon1f
Multilateral -.023 1.4-.030 1.1
Trade Weighted-.028 .0074 1.8-.040 .016 2.0
Index —.025 (.0062)[—.015] 2.0-.037 .014 [—.019] 2.1
-.021 (—.024) 1.7 —.027 (-.041) 1.4
Morgan Bank -.017 1.9 —.021 1.6
Bilateral -.020 (.003) 2.1-.025 .007 2.2
Index -.018 [.003][—.009) 2.2-.024 (.006)[-.012] 2.3
-.016 (—.013) 2.1-.019 (-.021) 1.9
Ger*an —.027 1.3 —.074 1.1
iark —.030 (.005) 1.4-.092 .030 1.6
-.027 [.004](—.027) 1.6-.083 .027 (—.073) 1.8
—.025 (—.032) 1.5 —.065 (-.103) 1.3
-.028 1.4 —.064 1.1
franc -.035 .011 2.2—.087 .040 2.4
-.033 .010 [—.016] 2.3—.084 .039[-.032] 2.5
—.026 (—.028) 1.6-.057 (—.076) 1.2
British -.018 .53-.014 .50
pound -.036 .030 1.6-.029 .026 1.5
—.041 .033 .047 2.4-.033 .028 .041 2.3
—.018 [.010] .53-.015 .50
Japaneee -.031 .74-6.55 .81
yen -.022 -.015 1.2-5.52 (-1.77) .93
—.015 —.018 —.0592.2 —3.77-2.50-15.22.2
—.028 (.039).79—5.48 -12.31.1
A coefficient in parentheses exceeds its standard error but Is
less than twice its standard error.A coefficient in square
brkets is less than its standard error. Other coefficients are
iore than twice their standard error.Constant tens are
estiiated but not shosin.The R2 of eadi equation exceede 0.9
except for the first and fourth equations for the British pound.REFERENCES
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